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Abstract: Psychological game theory can contribute to renew the analysis of unethical behavior
by providing insights on the nature of the moral costs of dishonesty. We investigate the moral
costs of embezzlement in situations where donors need intermediaries to transfer their donations
to recipients and where donations can be embezzled before they reach the recipients. We design
a novel three-player Embezzlement Mini-Game to study whether intermediaries in the labora-
tory suffer from guilt aversion and whether guilt aversion affects the decision to embezzle. We
show that the proportion of guilt-averse intermediaries is the same irrespective of the direction of
guilt and guilt aversion reduces embezzlement. Structural estimates indicate no difference in the
effect of guilt aversion toward the donor and toward the recipient on intermediaries’ behavior.
This is striking as embezzlement affects the earnings of the recipient but not those of the donor.
It shows that guilt aversion matters even when decisions have no direct monetary consequences.
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1 Introduction
Contrary to the standard economics-of-crime approach that focuses on the trade-off between
the monetary costs and benefits of dishonesty (Becker and Stigler, 1974; Fan et al., 2009), the
behavioral economic analysis of unethical behavior insists on the importance of incorporating
moral costs in this trade-off. Indeed, not all individuals cheat, even when there is no risk of
detection, and most cheaters do not exploit their opportunity of cheating maximally, which may
come from the moral costs associated with unethical behavior (see, e.g., Abeler et al., 2019;
Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi, 2013; Gneezy, 2005; Kajackaite and Gneezy, 2017; Mazar et al.,
2008, in the context of lying, and Abbink and Serra, 2012; Drugov et al., 2014; Ko¨bis et al.,
2016, in the context of corruption). However, little is known on the nature of these moral costs
beyond the idea that most people are willing to maintain a positive self-image. Psychological
game theory, introduced by Geanakoplos et al. (1989) and further developed by Battigalli and
Dufwenberg (2009), helps to understand the nature of these moral costs through the modeling
of emotions such as guilt aversion, although this theory has been rarely used so far to investigate
dishonesty (for a recent exception, see Dufwenberg and Dufwenberg, 2018).
In this paper, we study guilt aversion in the context of embezzlement. Embezzlement is
defined as the misappropriation of assets by individuals to whom they were entrusted, in order
to monopolize or to steal them. It can be observed when the providers of resources need inter-
mediaries to transfer these resources to the final recipients. The problem is crucial, especially in
developing countries, in domains such as health, education, or humanitarian aid where the final
recipients seldom receive the totality of aid transfers they are entitled to.1 Indeed, donors must
rely on local intermediaries and usually cannot verify which amount has eventually been trans-
ferred to the entitled recipients. Embezzlement is detrimental to economic development and
1For example, in 2000 in Ghana, a Public Expenditure Tracking Survey revealed that 80% of non-
salary funds did not reach health facilities (Canagarajah and Ye, 2001). For the period 1991-1995,
Ugandan schools received on average 13% of the governmental transfers they were entitled to (Reinikka
and Svensson, 2004). In 2013, the head of the governmental High Relief Committee was arrested for the
misappropriation of US$ 10 million earmarked for the aid of refugees in Lebanon.
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cooperation (Beekman et al., 2014; Olken and Pande, 2012) and it can result in some programs
becoming inequality enhancing (e.g., Reinikka and Svensson, 2004) or no longer cost-effective
(e.g., Ferraz et al., 2012).
While most of the previous literature has studied interventions affecting the monetary costs
and benefits attached to embezzlement (e.g., Barr et al., 2009; Di Tella and Schargrodsky,
2003; Olken, 2007), we investigate the moral cost of embezzling by studying the intermediary’s
willingness to avoid the anticipated negative valence associated with guilt from embezzlement.
Guilt aversion implies that an agent suffers a cost, i.e., feels guilty, if he lets down others’
expectations (Tangney and Fisher, 1995). Our first research objective is to identify in the
laboratory the existence of such guilt aversion and its impact on the behavior of intermediaries
who can embezzle the donations made by donors to recipients. Our second objective is to test
whether the direction of guilt aversion matters, i.e., whether it is stronger toward the donor or
toward the recipient.
We designed a novel three-player game – the Embezzlement Mini-Game. In this game, a
donor sends a donation to a recipient but this donation has to be transferred by an intermediary
who can embezzle a fraction of this donation to increase his own material payoff.2 Embezzlement
decreases both the utility of the donor who cares about the recipient’s well-being and the utility
of the recipient who receives the donation. The donor forms expectations on how much of the
donation the intermediary will transfer to the recipient. The recipient also has expectations on
how much he will receive. Depending on his decision, the intermediary can fulfill or not the other
two players’ expectations. Hence, the intermediary may be affected by donor-guilt aversion and
by recipient-guilt aversion.
Indirect evidence of intermediaries’ guilt aversion can be found in previous studies. Chlaß
2The game is meant to represent a situation in which an individual in a rich country sends money to
a charity to help improve the situation of individuals in need in developing countries. The donor and the
charity have to rely on local intermediaries, e.g., the heads of villages. In many cases, these intermediaries
are in a position to embezzle part of the donations – see for example the field experiments reported in
Beekman et al. (2014).
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et al. (2015) found that the more intermediaries believe that donors have donated, the more they
transfer. This is coherent with our model’s intuition which predicts that the more donors believe
the donation will be transferred, the more intermediaries transfer. Di Falco et al. (2016) found
that intermediaries at the beginning of longer transfer chains embezzle less than intermediaries
in short chains. Feeling guilty from letting down the recipients’ expectation could explain this
behavior.
We rely on the modeling of simple guilt aversion as a belief-dependent motivation by Charness
and Dufwenberg (2006) and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) (BD (2007), hereafter) in the
framework of psychological game theory. This theory departs from traditional game theory in
assuming that players’ utilities do not only depend on their decisions but also on their beliefs
about decisions, beliefs, or information. In particular, the psychological utility of a guilt-averse
player depends on his second-order beliefs, i.e., his beliefs about other players’ beliefs about
his own decision. For the recipient-guilt aversion of the intermediary, we rely on BD (2007)
definition of guilt as the disutility from letting down the recipient’s expectations about his own
payoff. For the donor-guilt aversion of the intermediary, we extend theoretically BD (2007) model
of simple guilt by introducing a novelty in the definition of guilt in the psy-games literature.
Rather than not letting down the donor’s expectations about his own payoff – which is not
affected by the decision to embezzle –, a donor-guilt averse intermediary dislikes letting down
the donor’s expectations about another player’s material payoff, i.e., the recipient. In this case,
the psychological utility of the guilt-averse player (the intermediary) depends on his beliefs about
another player’s beliefs (the donor) on a third player’s material payoff (the recipient).3
Our theoretical analysis builds on the incomplete-information framework with role-dependent
guilt of Attanasi et al. (2016). We assume that among the two active players only the intermedi-
ary can feel guilty. We enrich the set of psychological types by assuming that both the donor and
3In Balafoutas (2011), an extension of his dynamic model also allows for an official who accepts a
bribe to feel guilty toward both the citizen and the lobby. However, both directions of guilt are coherent
with BD (2007) model since the official can affect the payoff of both the citizen and the lobby.
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the intermediary have altruistic preferences toward the recipient. Unlike Attanasi et al. (2016),
we elaborate our behavioral hypotheses relying on best-reply analysis rather than on Bayesian
equilibrium. This is motivated by the fact that a standard equilibrium analysis has no com-
pelling foundation for games played one-shot (like ours) and in experiments on other-regarding
preferences. Furthermore, and more importantly, in a psychological type space with the donor’s
and intermediary’s altruism toward the recipient and with the intermediary’s guilt toward the
recipient and the donor, best-reply analysis can be carried out regardless of (in)completeness of
information about players’ types.4 Thus, it delivers sharp predictions on the correlation between
the intermediary’s guilt types and behavior, and between his second-order beliefs and behavior,
independently of the direction of guilt aversion (donor-guilt or recipient-guilt). Predicting the
sign and size of these correlations is enough to provide appropriate behavioral hypotheses given
the two research objectives mentioned above.
We implemented our Embezzlement Mini-Game in a laboratory experiment that allows us
to measure directly the role of second-order beliefs on the intermediaries’ decision to embezzle
donations, adapting the belief-dependent menu method of Khalmetski et al. (2015). Between-
subjects, we manipulated the information given to the intermediaries before they made their
decision. In the Donor treatment, intermediaries decided whether to transfer or not the whole
donation for each possible first-order belief of the donor on their decision. In the Recipient treat-
ment, they made a decision for each possible first-order belief of the recipient on their decision.
We can therefore compare the intermediaries’ donor-guilt aversion and recipient-guilt aversion.
Within-subjects, we manipulated the percentage of the donation that could be embezzled (80%
in the High condition and 60% in the Low condition) to test how the intensity of potential
embezzlement affects beliefs.
Our results show that on average 25% of the intermediaries are guilt-averse, i.e., their decision
to embezzle is influenced by others’ expectations, and this holds regardless of the direction of
4Indeed, ours is an incomplete-information framework with private values. Hence, beliefs about the
types of others do not enter the best-reply correspondence.
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the guilt and of the percentage of the donation that could be embezzled. Structural estimates
indicate no difference in the effect of guilt aversion toward the donor and toward the recipient
on intermediaries’ behavior. This shows that guilt aversion may influence behavior even when
decisions have no direct monetary consequences on the person toward whom guilt is directed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical
model and its predictions. Section 3 describes the experimental design. Section 4 presents the
results. Section 5 discusses and concludes.
2 Theoretical Model and Behavioral Hypotheses
2.1 The Embezzlement Mini-Game(s)
The Embezzlement Mini-Game involves three players: a donor, an intermediary and a recipient
(see Fig. 1). Players’ material payoffs in Fig. 1 are shown according to such order.
Figure 1: The Embezzlement Mini-Game(s)
The three players receive an initial endowment: 150 ECU (Experimental Currency Units)
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for the donor, 80 ECU for the intermediary, and 10 ECU for the recipient (with 10 ECU = e1.2
in the experiment). Thus, the intermediary’s endowment is the median between the donor’s and
the recipient’s endowments.5
The donor can Keep his endowment (in which case the game ends and each player earns his
endowment) or Give 25 ECU to the recipient. However, the donation cannot be given directly to
the recipient, it has to be transferred through the intermediary. The intermediary has to decide
whether to Transfer the entirety of the donation to the recipient or to Embezzle a fraction f of
the 25 ECU and transfer (1–f ) to the recipient. The recipient receives twice the amount actually
transferred. Thus, embezzlement involves an efficiency loss.6
Using a within-subject design, the Mini-Game is played under two conditions, each one
allowing the intermediary to Embezzle a different fraction of the donation: in the Low condition,
f = 0.6, and in the High condition, f = 0.8. Therefore, the two Mini-Games only differ for the
set of possible actions of the intermediary (respectively, f ∈ {0, 0.6} and f ∈ {0, 0.8}).
Fig. 1 also shows two features of the final payoff distributions under each of these two
conditions. First, no decision can lead to the equalization of payoffs between two or three
players. Hence, no payoff distribution should be more salient than others. Second, the ranking
of payoffs cannot be affected by the players’ decisions. By doing so, we limit social comparison
motives.
2.2 Utility Functions
Figure 1 shows respectively the Donor’s, I ntermediary’s and Recipient’s material payoff (Mj ,
with j ∈ {D, I,R}) at each terminal node of the Embezzlement Mini-Game, i.e., for each profile
5The intermediary can be seen as the middleman in a network linking a NGO or a Governmental
Agency to villagers. Different sets of possible actions for the donor and the intermediary capture asym-
metry of positions. Unlike in a consecutive three-person dictator game (Bahr and Requate, 2014), the
different initial endowments underline the different status of each player.
6This feature (also used in Boly et al. (2016)) captures a negative externality associated with embez-
zlement (see Ferraz et al. (2012), for an illustration in the domain of education in Brazil). The presence
of a negative externality should reinforce the immoral image of embezzlement.
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of donor’s and intermediary’s strategy, respectively sD ∈ {Keep,Give} and sI ∈ {Transfer if Give,
Embezzle if Give}. We denote the donor’s strategies Keep and Give with respectively K and
G, and the intermediary’s strategies Transfer if Give and Embezzle if Give with respectively
T and E.
First of all, we assume that the recipient’s utility function coincides with his material
payoff, i.e., UR(sD, sI) = MR(sD, sI), which is made of his initial endowment, and the amount
received r(sD, sI). The latter enters the recipient’s utility function only if the donor chooses Give,
i.e., sD = G. In that case, the amount received depends on the amount actually transferred
by the intermediary, r(sI). We are interested in the recipient’s beliefs only in terms of their
psychological impact on the intermediary’s strategy sI . Thus, in the experiment we only elicited
αRI , namely the recipient’s first-order belief that the intermediary chooses Transfer, conditional
on the donor choosing Give. Hence, our focus is on the recipient’s expected received amount in
this subgame:
ER[r(sI)|sD = G] = αRI · r(T ) + (1− αRI) · r(E) (1)
Let us now introduce the donor’s utility function. It is composed of his material payoff and
his feeling of altruism toward the recipient (Eq. (2)). We assume that the donor (as well as the
intermediary) have altruistic preferences toward the recipient. A player’s feeling of altruism, AjR
with j ∈ {D, I}, represents player j’s utility derived from an increase in the amount received
by the recipient (belief-independent preferences). It is the product of two terms: γj ≥ 0, player
j’s altruism sensitivity toward the recipient, i.e., his altruistic type, and r(sD, sI), the amount
actually received by the recipient. With this, the donor’s utility is:
UD(γD, sD, sI) = MD(sD) +ADR(γD, sD, sI) (2)
where ADR(γD, sD, sI) = γD · r(sD, sI) (3)
When the donor chooses between Keep and Give, he does not know what would be the inter-
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mediary’s strategy. Therefore, his first-order belief that the intermediary chooses Transfer after
Give, αDI , matters for his giving choice. His expected utility conditional on choosing Give is:
ED[UD(γD, sI)|sD = G] = MD(G) + γD · ED[r(sI)|sD = G] (4)
where the amount the donor expects the recipient to get after his Give choice is:
ED[r(sI)|sD = G] = αDI · r(T ) + (1− αDI) · r(E) (5)
We made the simplifying assumption that a donor prefers that his donation increases the
recipient’s payoff rather than the intermediary’s. This is broadly consistent with other models
of distributional preferences: inequity aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt,
1999), since the recipient is the most disadvantaged player, and concern for efficiency (Charness
and Rabin, 2002), since the sum of payoffs is maximized if the donor Gives and the intermediary
Transfers. Importantly, our experimental design allows us to test this assumption: we elicit the
donor’s first-order belief that the intermediary will choose Transfer after Give. If the donor’s
utility increases with the recipient’s payoff, we should find that the frequency of giving increases
in the donor’s first-order belief about Transfer after Give.
We finally introduce the intermediary’s utility function. The intermediary’s utility (Eq.
(6)) is composed of his material payoff MI , his feeling of altruism toward the recipient AIR
(Eq. (7)), and his feeling of guilt toward the other players BIj , with j ∈ {D,R} (Eq. (8)).
As anticipated, we assume that the intermediary has altruistic preferences toward the recipient
and that they are modeled as the donor’s ones (see Eqs. (2) and (3)). Second, in line with the
role-dependent guilt model of Attanasi et al. (2016), we assume that only the intermediary can
feel guilty.7 The intermediary’s feeling of guilt, BIj , with j ∈ {D,R}, represents his disutility
7See the discussion in Attanasi et al. (2016), p. 649, where they argue that role dependence of
guilt preferences is plausible in asymmetric games (see, e.g., Attanasi et al., 2013, 2018, for indirect
experimental evidence corroborating the assumption). In particular, they discuss how the assumption
8
derived from letting down other players’ expectations on the strategy he will select (belief-
dependent preferences). It is the product of two terms: θIj ≥ 0, the guilt sensitivity toward
player j ∈ {D,R}, i.e., the intermediary’s guilt type; and the difference, if positive, between
player j’s expectations on the transferred amount after Give, Ej [r(sI)|sD = G], and the amount
actually transferred to the recipient r(sI). This difference depends both on the intermediary’s
strategy, and on player j’s first-order belief about this strategy (see Eqs. (1) and (5), respectively
for j = R and j = D).
If Ej [r(sI)|sD = G] > r(sI), then the intermediary feels guilty from letting down player j’s
expectations on the amount transferred to the recipient. Independently from the treatment, the
intermediary does not feel guilty if (sD, sI) = (G,T ), i.e., the donor gives and the intermediary
transfers the whole donation to the recipient. With this, the intermediary’s utility is, for j ∈
{D,R}:
UI(θIj , γI , sI , αjI |sD = G) = MI(G, sI) +AIR(γI , sI)−BIj(θIj , sI , αjI) (6)
where AIR(γI , sI) = γI · r(sI) (7)
and BIj(θIj , sI , αjI) = θIj ·max{0,Ej [r(sI)|sD = G]− r(sI)} (8)
Two clarifications are in order about Equation (8).
First, we analyze the impact of each guilt sensitivity (toward the donor and toward the
recipient) separately because of our experimental design. We use a between-subject design
to elicit the intermediary’s belief-dependent strategy conditional on either the donor’s (Donor
treatment) or the recipient’s (Recipient treatment) first-order beliefs. Therefore, we make the
auxiliary assumption that one direction of guilt prevails over the other in each treatment, i.e.,
θIR = 0 in the Donor treatment and θID = 0 in the Recipient treatment.
that sensitivity to guilt is triggered only when playing in the role of trustee (and not in the role of trustor)
in the Trust Game resonates with the evolutionary psychology of emotions and the conceptual act theory
of emotion. Similar arguments can be provided in support of sensitivity to guilt being triggered only
when playing in the role of intermediary (and not in the role of donor) in the Embezzlement Mini-Game.
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Second, for BIR (Eq. (8) with j = R), we rely on BD’s (2007) definition of simple guilt
as the intermediary’s disutility from letting down the recipient’s expectations about his own
material payoff, whereas, for BID (Eq. (8) with j = D), we extend BD (2007) by defining
the intermediary’s guilt as the disutility from letting down the donor’s expectations about the
recipient ’s material payoff (ED[r(sI)|sD = G]).
2.3 Theoretical Predictions
We provide a best-reply analysis of the Embezzlement Mini-Game(s) with incomplete informa-
tion. We assume for simplicity that the recipient is commonly known to be selfish. But neither
the donor’s altruistic type, γD, nor the intermediary’s guilt-altruistic type, (θIj ,γI), are known
to the co-players.
The analysis relies on the assumption of players’ rationality: each player is rational, i.e., a
subjective expected utility maximizer.8
2.3.1 Predictions on Donor’s behavior
We define the donor’s Willingness-to-Give function (WG) as the difference between his (ex-
pected) utility from Give (Eq. (5)) and his (certain) utility from Keep, the latter coinciding
with his initial endowment, MD(K). The more the donor prefers to Give rather than Keep, the
higher his willingness to Give:
WG(γD, αDI) = ED[UD(γD, sI |sD = G]− UD(γD|sD = K)
= MD(G)−MD(K) + γD · (αDI · r(T ) + (1− αDI) · r(E)) (9)
8A two-step rationalizability procedure based on forward-induction reasoning (cf. Battigalli and
Dufwenberg (2009), Section 5; Battigalli et al., 2019a,b) would provide similar qualitative predictions,
by assuming that θID > 0 and θIR > 0 at the same time in both treatments. Technical details of this
analysis are available from the authors upon request.
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In the two conditions of the Mini-Embezzlement Game in Fig. 1, a rational donor prefers to
Give in the Low condition if WG = −25 + γD · (αDI · 30 + 20) > 0, and in the High condition
if WG = −25 + γD · (αDI · 40 + 10) > 0. This leads to the following set of ‘type-belief’ pairs
consistent with a Rational donor choosing Give in the Low and High conditions, respectively:
R
G|Low
D =
{
(γD, αDI) : αDI ≥ 1
6
(
5
γD
− 4
)}
(10)
R
G|High
D =
{
(γD, αDI) : αDI ≥ 1
8
(
5
γD
− 2
)}
(11)
Eqs. (10) and (11) are represented in Fig. 2. The figure shows the (sD|Low, sD|High) regions
of the donor’s ‘type-belief’ space (γD, αDI), where the rational donor is predicted to: Keep
in both conditions (white region); Give in the Low and Keep in the High condition (light
grey region); Give in both conditions (dark grey region). From Eqs. (10) and (11), it is
easy to check that (R
K|Low
D ∩ RG|HighD ) = ∅, i.e., holding the ‘type-belief’ pair constant across
conditions, a Rational donor cannot choose Keep in the Low and Give in the High condition,
which explains the absence of a (Keep,Give) region in Fig. 2. The horizontal lines indicate the
four possible first-order beliefs about the intermediary that a donor can hold in our experiment,
αDI ∈ {0, 1/3, 2/3, 1}, as we will explain in Section 3.1.
Figure 2: Predicted behavior of a rational donor in the two conditions (Low, High), depending on his
altruistic type (γD) and first-order belief (αDI)
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A comparative static analysis across the three regions of predictions in Fig. 2 allows us to
elaborate our hypotheses about the donor’s behavior.
First, let us fix the pair (γD, αDI = 0), i.e., a donor with no trust on the intermediary’s
Transfer choice, and let us increase his first-order belief αDI . For γD ∈ [0, 1/2], the donor prefers
to Keep in both conditions, for any αDI (white region). For γD ∈ (1/2, 5/4], as αDI begins to
increase, the donor switches from Keep to Give in the Low condition (light grey region); if αDI
continues to increase, he switches from Keep to Give also in the High condition (dark grey
region). For γD ∈ (5/4, 5/2], the donor prefers to Give in the Low condition, for any αDI (light
grey region); as αDI increases, the donor switches from Keep to Give in the High condition
(dark grey region). For γD ∈ (5/2,+∞), the donor prefers to Give in both conditions, for any
αDI (dark grey region). Therefore, independently from the condition, an increase in αDI never
leads to a switch from Give to Keep and for some subset of donor’s sensitivities to altruism it
leads to a switch from Keep to Give. Considering heterogeneity in donors’ types, we elaborate
a hypothesis about the donor’s belief-dependent behavior, whose verification is crucial to
validate our assumption that the donor’s utility increases with the recipient’s payoff.
H.D1 [Choice-Belief Correlation]: The frequency of Give choices by altruistic donors in-
creases in their first-order belief about Transfer.
Now suppose that the pair (γD, αDI) is the same in the Low and High conditions, and refer
again to Fig. 2. If this ‘type-belief’ pair belongs to the white or the dark grey region, the rational
choice is the same in both conditions, while if it lies in the light grey region, the rational choice
is Give in the Low and Keep in the High condition. There is no ‘type-belief’ pair in the light
grey region for αDI = 1, i.e., when the donor is certain that the intermediary will Transfer. In
that case, being the payoff profile after history (Give, Transfer) invariant to the condition (see
1), the donor’s WG in Eq. (9) is the same both in the Low and High condition, and so the
predicted choice. Since conditions are manipulated within-subjects (see Section 3.1), we assume
that the distribution of donors’ types is the same across conditions. Belief elicitation in the two
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conditions will allow us to check their invariance to the condition, that we assume in order to
elaborate a hypothesis about the donor’s condition-dependent behavior.
H.D2 [High vs. Low Condition on Choice]: Given the same donor’s first-order belief about
Transfer lower than one, same in both conditions, the frequency of Give choices by altruistic
donors is higher in the Low than in the High condition.
Finally, let us fix the pair (γD = 0, αDI), i.e., a selfish donor. Fig. 2 shows that as his
sensitivity to altruism γD increases, the donor moves from the white region directly to the dark
grey region for αDI = 1, or passing through the light grey region for all αDI < 1. Therefore,
independently from the condition, an increase in γD never leads to a switch from Give to Keep
and it can lead to a switch from Keep to Give. Considering heterogeneity in donors’ sensitivity
to altruism, we elaborate a hypothesis about the donor’s type-dependent behavior.
H.D3 [Choice-Type Correlation]: For a given first-order belief about Transfer, the frequency
of Give choices increases with the donor’s sensitivity to altruism.
Note that we derived H.D1, H.D2, and H.D3 without specifying the treatment (Donor or
Recipient) since, in our experiment, donors are unaware of the treatment when they make their
choices. Therefore, the donor’s behavior should be treatment-independent.
2.3.2 Predictions on Intermediary’s behavior
Relying on Eqs. (6–8), we define for each treatment (Donor and Recipient) the intermediary’s
Willingness-to-Transfer function (WT ) as the difference between his utility when he Transfers
and his utility when he Embezzles. Both these terms are expected utilities since the intermediary
forms beliefs about the first-order beliefs αjI of the co-player j toward whom he feels guilty
(j = D in the Donor and j = R in the Recipient treatment).9 These are his conditional second-
9Here we assume that the intermediary best-responds as if he had truly observed the donor’s move.
This holds by standard expected-utility maximization, except for the cases where the intermediary is
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order beliefs βIj = EI [αjI |sD = G], i.e., for j ∈ D,R, conditional on the donor choosing Give.10
The more the intermediary prefers to Transfer rather than Embezzle, the higher his willingness
to Transfer.11 Thus, for j ∈ {D,R}:
WT (θIj , γI , βjI |sD = G) = EI [UI(θIj , γI , αjI |G,T )]− EI [UI(θIj , γI , αjI |G,E)]
= MI(G,T )−MI(G,E) + γI · [r(T ))− r(E)] + (12)
θIj · [βIj · r(T ) + (1− βIj) · r(E))− r(E)]
Rationality of the intermediary implies, for j ∈ {D,R}, that type (θIj ,γI) with belief βIj chooses
to Transfer the donation if WT > 0 in Eq. (12) and to Embezzle a fraction of it otherwise. In
the two conditions of the Mini-Embezzlement Game in Fig. 1, Eq. (12) becomes, for j ∈ {D,R},
WT = −15 + 30 · (γI + θIj ·βIj) in the Low condition and WT = −20 + 40 · (γI + θIj ·βIj) in the
High condition. This leads to the following set of ‘type-belief’ pairs consistent with a Rational
intermediary choosing Transfer in the Low and High conditions:
R
T |Low
I = R
T |High
I =
{
((θIj , γI), βIj) : γI + θIj · βIj >
1
2
}
(13)
Note that for each ‘type-belief’ pair ((θIj , γI), βIj), the sign of WT is the same in both con-
ditions. Thus, also the complementary set of ‘type-belief’ pairs consistent with a Rational
intermediary choosing Embezzle is independent from the condition, i.e., R
E|Low
I = R
E|High
I .
Fig. 3 shows the regions of the intermediary’s type space (θIj , γI), where a rational inter-
mediary is predicted to Embezzle in both conditions or Transfer in both conditions for fixed
conditional second-order beliefs about Transfer.12 More precisely, for each type (θIj , γI) it is
certain that the donor has chosen Keep. Thus, we need the additional assumption that the intermediary
has a belief conditional on Give, even if he is certain of Keep. Indeed, in our experiment the intermediary’s
decision is made under the strategy method, i.e., both when the donor has chosen Keep and when he has
chosen Give (see Section 3.1).
10More precisely, we reason as if the intermediary has a point belief βIj about αjI conditional on Give.
11Note that if the intermediary Transfers he experiences no guilt, and so BIj = 0 in Eq. (8).
12Recall that, as anticipated above, in our experiment both the donor and the recipient can only hold
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shown the best-reply strategy for βIj ∈ {0, 1/3, 2/3, 1}. The four dotted lines indicate types
indifferent between Embezzle and Transfer for each of these βIj . Thus, e.g., types in the white
region Embezzle for all the four possible βIj , while types in the lightest-grey region Embezzle
for βIj ∈ {0, 1/3, 2/3} and Transfer for βIj = 1, i.e., they switch from Embezzle to Transfer for
βIj = 1.
Figure 3: Predicted behavior of a rational intermediary for the four possible second-order beliefs βIj ∈
{0, 1/3, 2/3, 1}, depending on his guilt type (θIj) and altruistic type (γI)
A comparative static analysis of WT in Eq. (12) and of the four regions of predictions in
Figure 3 allows us to elaborate our hypotheses about the intermediary’s behavior.
First of all, Fig. 3 shows that if γI > 1/2, then the intermediary always Transfers, indepen-
dently from θIj and βIj . In that case, sensitivity to altruism is sufficiently high to prevail over
guilt aversion. For γI < 1/2, if the intermediary is guilt-averse (θIj > 0), WT in Eq. (12) is
increasing in βIj , i.e.,
δWT
δβIj
> 0 independently from the condition Low or High. Therefore, our
first hypothesis is about the intermediary’s belief-dependent behavior:
H.I1 [Choice-Belief Correlation]: For sufficiently low sensitivity to altruism toward the
recipient, the frequency of Transfer choices by guilt-averse intermediaries increases in their
four possible first-order beliefs about Transfer, αjI ∈ {0, 1/3, 2/3, 1} (see Section 3.1). With this, we
make the operational assumption that also the intermediary can only hold four possible second-order
beliefs, βIj ∈ {0, 1/3, 2/3, 1}, on each co-player j ∈ {D,R}.
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second-order beliefs about Transfer. Intermediaries with sufficiently high sensitivity to altruism
choose to Transfer regardless of their second-order beliefs.
The second part of H.I1 suggests that the fraction of guilt-averse intermediaries in the sam-
ple of experimental participants might be underestimated by only looking at their behavior. In
fact, although donor-guilt or recipient-guilt averse, some intermediaries could disclose a belief-
independent Transfer pattern due to a sufficiently high sensitivity to altruism toward the recip-
ient.
Furthermore, knowing from Eq. (13) that R
sI |Low
I = R
sI |High
I for sI ∈ {T,E}, we can elab-
orate the following hypothesis about the intermediary’s condition-independent behavior.
Note that conditions are manipulated within-subjects, thus we can assume that the distribution
of the intermediaries’ types is the same across conditions. Belief elicitation in the two conditions
will allow us to check their invariance to the condition, that we assume here:
H.I2 [Low vs. High Condition on Choice]: Given the same second-order belief about Transfer
in both conditions, the frequency of Transfer choices by intermediaries is the same in the Low
and in the High conditions.
Third, WT in Eq. (12) is increasing in γIj , i.e.,
δWT
δγIj
> 0, and, for strictly positive second-
order beliefs, in θIj , i.e.,
δWT
δθIj
> 0, independently from the condition Low or High. Furthermore,
Fig. 3 shows that, fixing γI < 1/2 in the white region and moving horizontally through consecu-
tive increases in θIj , the intermediary switches from Embezzle to Transfer first for βIj = 1, then
for βIj = 2/3, and finally for βIj = 1/3. However, even for θIj →∞, he will never switch from
Embezzle to Transfer for βIj = 0. All this is summarized in the following hypothesis about the
intermediary’s type-dependent behavior:
H.I3 [Choice-Type Correlation]: Given the second-order belief, the frequency of Transfer
choices increases with the altruism sensitivity; it increases with the guilt sensitivity only if the
second-order belief is strictly positive. Furthermore, given a sufficiently low altruism sensitivity,
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the higher the guilt sensitivity, the lower the second-order belief about Transfer sufficient to
switch from Embezzle to Transfer.
Note that we derived H.I1, H.I2, and H.I3 without specifying the treatment (Donor or
Recipient), and that these hypotheses should hold in both treatments, if no treatment difference
in the distribution of intermediaries’ psychological types (θIj , γI) were detected. Altruism being
a distributional preference, hence belief-independent, we expect the sensitivity to altruism not to
depend on the fact that the intermediary’s belief-dependent strategy relies on the donor’s or the
recipient’s first-order beliefs. Conversely, the sensitivity to guilt might depend on the direction,
i.e., on whether it is elicited toward the donor or toward the recipient. Indeed, this is one of
the two main research objectives of our study. However, absent previous experimental evidence
on this issue, we elaborate our last hypothesis on the intermediary’s treatment-independent
behavior assuming the same distribution of guilt types across treatments:
H.I4 [Donor vs. Recipient treatment on Choice]: Under the same distribution of sensitivities
to guilt and altruism, intermediaries’ behavior is the same in both the Donor and the Recipient
treatments.
3 Experimental Design and Procedures
We now describe in details how the game has been implemented in the laboratory.
3.1 Experimental Design
First-Order Belief Elicitation
First, we elicited the players’ first-order beliefs about the donors’ and the intermediaries’ deci-
sions in the game. Intermediaries and recipients had to report their beliefs about the number of
donors, out of three donors randomly selected in the session, who choose to give in the Low and
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in the High conditions that were played within-subjects. Similarly, donors and recipients had
to report their beliefs about the number of intermediaries, out of three intermediaries randomly
selected in the session, who choose to transfer the donation in full in each condition (conditional
on the donor’s decision to give). The belief elicitation was incentivized. For each role, one belief
was randomly selected at the end of the session and paid e1 if accurate.13
Donors’ and Intermediaries’ Decision-Making
Second, subjects played the Embezzlement Mini-Game. Two treatments of this game were imple-
mented between-subjects: the Donor treatment and the Recipient treatment.14 Within-subjects,
donors made a binary choice between giving a pre-determined fraction of their endowment and
keeping their whole endowment, both in the Low and in the High conditions. These two decisions
allow us to test whether the giving decision varies with the percentage potentially embezzled by
the intermediary as predicted in Hypothesis H.D2.
Then, intermediaries made binary choices between transferring the entirety of the amount
given by the donor or transferring only a pre-determined fraction of this donation, both in the
Low and in the High conditions. Whether intermediaries started with the Low or with the
High condition was determined randomly at the individual level. These decisions were made
under the veil of ignorance, i.e., assuming that the donor had chosen to give a positive amount.
We used the belief-dependent menu method of Khalmetski et al. (2015). In each condition, in
the Donor (Recipient) treatment, intermediaries made four transfer decisions corresponding to
the four possible first-order beliefs of the donor (recipient) on the frequency of intermediaries
transferring: the donor’s (recipient’s) beliefs that none, one, two or three out of three inter-
13This incentivization procedure is the easiest to understand for subjects. Nevertheless, we contend that
it is not perfectly incentive-compatible for risk-averse recipients who may under-estimate the probability
that donors Give and that intermediaries Transfer to the recipients. However, this concern is hindered
both in theory – since there are four possible beliefs, one cannot be perfectly insured against risk – and
in practice – we find an insignificant correlation between risk aversion and beliefs (see Table A11 in
Appendix A).
14We used a between-subject design for studying the intermediaries’ donor-guilt aversion and recipient-
guilt aversion because we were anxious that using a within-subject design would be confusing for the
subjects and would require too much concentration.
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mediaries transfer in full. To facilitate decision-making, these first-order beliefs were presented
in a fixed increasing order (see an example of a decision screen in Section C.1).15. Although
one might argue that responses elicited with this method are “cold”, this method offers several
advantages. First, it allows us to rule out potential false-consensus effects without raising the
issue of strategic reporting and without using deception. The false-consensus effect could be
avoided by communicating the donors’ (recipients’) true beliefs to the intermediaries. However,
it requires choosing between two evils: if the donors (recipients) know that their beliefs will
be communicated, they are likely to distort them; and if they do not know that their beliefs
will be communicated, the design is arguably deceptive. The menu method avoids these draw-
backs. Moreover, it allows us to study guilt aversion at the individual level and, hence, to unveil
inter-individual differences that are hidden at the aggregate level (Khalmetski et al., 2015)
At the end of the session, the computer program randomly selected either the Low or the
High condition. Given that the donor had given a share of his endowment in this condition,
the program implemented the intermediary’s decision corresponding to the actual belief of the
donor or of the recipient, depending on the treatment, in this condition. This determined the
donor’s, the intermediary’s and the recipient’s payoffs in this part.
Second-Order Belief Elicitation and Social Norms
Third, before subjects received any feedback on payoffs and others’ decisions, we elicited the
second-order beliefs of the donors and of the intermediaries on the other players’ first-order
beliefs, both in the Low and in the High conditions. Donors had to guess their intermediary’s
and their recipient’s first-order beliefs on the donors’ decisions (four second-order-beliefs in total).
Similarly, intermediaries had to guess their donor’s and their recipient’s first-order beliefs on the
intermediaries’ decisions (four second-order-beliefs in total). A second-order belief is considered
correct if it corresponds to the partner’s actual first-order belief.
15The use of the menu method is frequent in the experimental literature on guilt aversion (Attanasi
et al., 2013; Balafoutas and Fornwagner, 2017; Bellemare et al., 2017, 2018; Dhami et al., 2019; Hauge,
2016; Khalmetski et al., 2015)
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Moreover, anticipating that behavior in this game may depend on social norms and on the
beliefs about others’ social norms, we elicited all the subjects’ social norms in the session as well
as the donors’ and the intermediaries’ beliefs about their partners’ social norms.16
The players’ social norms were identified, using the Krupka and Weber (2013) procedure, for
each donors’ and intermediaries’ possible decision both in the Low and in the High conditions.
In each condition, players had to rate the social appropriateness of each decision on a four-item
scale (eight answers in total). An answer is considered correct if it corresponds to the modal
answer of the subjects in the same role. Using coordination games among players with the same
role to incentivize this procedure allows us to identify whether social norms differ across roles.
In fact, similarly to Erkut et al. (2015), we found that social norms do not differ across roles in
seven out of eight cases (Kruskal-Wallis tests, see Table A12 in Appendix A).17
Then, donors had to guess their intermediary’s and their recipient’s ratings of the social
appropriateness of the donors’ possible decisions (four answers). Similarly, intermediaries had
to guess their donor’s and their recipient’s ratings of the social appropriateness of the interme-
diaries’ possible decisions (four answers). Recipients had no guess to report.
For each subject, we randomly selected one answer among all those provided during this
third part. A correct answer paid e1.
Elicitation of Individual Characteristics
Since our model predicts that guilt proneness (Hypothesis H.I3) and altruism (Hypotheses H.D3,
H.I3) affect behavior in the game, we elicited the subjects’ social preferences by means of several
psychological tests. A survey was completed online about a week prior the laboratory session to
limit the risk of contamination between this task and the game. Subjects were paid a flat fee of
e7 for completing this survey on time and for showing-up at the session in the laboratory.
16Note that d’Adda et al. (2016) found no difference in responses between eliciting normative judgments
a` la Krupka and Weber (2013) before or after playing the main game.
17Ratings of social appropriateness differ in one instance only: in the Low condition, intermediaries
consider that Embezzle is less socially appropriate than donors do.
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The survey was composed of four parts (see Section C.2). In the first part, subjects com-
pleted the Guilt and Shame Proneness (GASP) questionnaire of Cohen et al. (2011). We were
particularly attentive to the Guilt-Negative-Behavior-Evaluation subscale that assesses one’s
proneness to feel bad about how one acted. The second part was included to control for poten-
tially relevant psychological traits. It corresponds to the Honesty-Humility scale extracted from
the 100-item HEXACO Personality Inventory – Revised test (Ashton and Lee, 2008). We were
interested in the responses to the Fairness subscale that aims at assessing a tendency to avoid
dishonesty. The third part consisted of 16 questions from the Self-Reported Altruism Scale
(Rushton et al., 1981). Finally, in the fourth part, we collected standard socio-demographic
characteristics, including gender, age, professional status, number of past participations in eco-
nomic experiments, self-reported risk attitudes (using the procedure of Dohmen et al., 2011),
and self-reported time preferences (using the procedure of Vischer et al., 2013).
3.2 Procedures
The experiment was conducted at GATE-Lab, Lyon, France. It was computerized using the
software Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were recruited mainly from the undergraduate
student population of local business, engineering, and medical schools by email, using the soft-
ware Hroot (Bock et al., 2014). 369 subjects participated in a total of 19 sessions. 52.72% are
females and the average age is 21.85 years (S.D. = 4.54). Table A1 in Appendix A summarizes
the characteristics of each session.
When subjects registered for the experiment, about a week before the date of the lab ses-
sion, they were sent an invitation email to complete the online questionnaire. Completing the
questionnaire took about 10 minutes. Participants were informed that they would receive their
fixed payment of e7 for this task and for showing-up at the laboratory session. Only those who
completed the online questionnaire were allowed to participate in the session. In the lab session,
at their arrival subjects were randomly assigned to a cubicle after drawing a tag in an opaque
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bag. The instructions (see Section C.1) were distributed for each part after completion of the
previous part. Before the first part, subjects had to answer a comprehension questionnaire. In
the first part, subjects reported their first-order beliefs and the donors made their decisions.
In the second part, the intermediaries made their decisions. In the third part, we elicited the
subjects’ social norms and second-order beliefs.
Each session lasted about 75 minutes. The average earnings were e17.70 (S.D. = 6.19),
including the e7 fee for completing the online questionnaire and for showing-up. Earnings were
paid in private in a separate room.
4 Results
We begin this section by two comments on social norms and beliefs (see summary statistics and
significance tests in Table A2 in Appendix A). First, Give and Transfer choices are rated by
the participants as significantly more socially appropriate than, respectively, Keep and Embezzle
choices, in both conditions (Wilcoxon signed rank tests, W hereafter, p < 0.001). Second,
the donors’ actual (non-induced) second-order beliefs (SOB, hereafter) are accurate guesses of
the intermediaries’ and recipients’ first-order beliefs (FOB, hereafter) on the frequency of Give
choices in both conditions (Mann-Whitney rank sum tests, MW hereafter, between SOB and
FOB, smallest p = 0.44). However, intermediaries tend to overestimate donors’ and recipients’
FOB on the frequency of Transfer choices (MW tests, p < 0.05 in three out of four cases).
In the following, we consider first, the donors’ behavior (Section 4.1) and next, the intermedi-
aries’ behavior (Section 4.2). For each behavioral hypothesis, we check for treatment differences
under the label [Donor vs. Recipient treatments]. Except when specified otherwise, the non-
parametric tests are two-sided; an independent observation corresponds to a decision (since only
one decision per participant is payoff relevant); the results from the two treatments are pooled.
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4.1 Donors’ Behavior
The comparison of our data to the set of ‘type-belief’ pairs consistent with a Rational donor (Eqs.
(10) and (11)) shows that our model captures 92.30% of the observed behavior (see the details
and the implications in terms of altruism sensitivity in Table A4 to Table A7 in Appendix A).
Overall, 48.78% of donors chose Give in the Low condition and 36.56% in the High condition.
Figure 4 displays, for each condition, the proportion of donors who choose either Give or Keep,
depending on their FOB on the frequency of Transfer choices (see also Table A3 in Appendix A).
The figure illustrates our first two results on the donors’ behavior.
Figure 4: Distribution of the donors’ choices depending on their first-order beliefs
Result D1 [Choice-Belief Correlation]: The higher the donors’ FOB about Transfer, the
higher the frequency of Give choices. This holds in both conditions.18
Support for Result D1: There is a significant positive correlation between the donors’
FOB about Transfer and their decision to Give (Spearman rank correlation, S hereafter, rs =
18One may suspect that an experimenter demand effect might explain donors’ giving despite the sure
loss of material payoff entailed by the Give choice. However, the detected positive correlation between
donors’ Give choices and their first-order belief of intermediary’s Transfer choices makes us confident
that an experimenter demand effect is not the main driver of donors’ behavior.
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0.35, p < 0.001). When we distinguish between conditions, the correlation in the Low condition
(S correlation, rs = 0.51, p < 0.001) is significantly higher than in the High condition (S
correlation, rs = 0.22, p < 0.001) (ZPF statistic, z = 3.05, p < 0.001).
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[Donor vs. Recipient treatments]: The correlation between the donors’ FOB on the frequency
of Transfer choices and their decision to Give is not significantly different across treatments
(Donor treatment: rs = 0.44, p < 0.001; Recipient treatment: rs = 0.24, p < 0.001; Z test,
z = −1.23, p = 0.210).
Result D2 [High vs. Low Condition on Choice]: Controlling for the donors’ FOB about
Transfer, the frequency of Give choices is higher in the Low than in the High condition.
Support for Result D2: We use Mc Nemar tests (MN, hereafter) to consider each donor
as an independent observation. For a given FOB about Transfer, the frequency of Give choices
is significantly higher in the Low than in the High condition (MN tests; FOB(0): χ2=4.76,
p = 0.029; FOB (0.33): χ2=3.60, p = 0.057).20
[Donor vs. Recipient treatments]: Even though donors could not know which treatment
was implemented when they made their choices, our results differ across treatments. Result
D2 is supported in the Donor treatment (MN tests; FOB(0): χ2=3.57, p = 0.058; FOB (0.33):
χ2=3.00, p = 0.083) but not in the Recipient Treatment (MN tests; FOB(0): χ2=1.60, p = 0.205;
FOB (0.33): χ2=1.29, p = 0.252).
Result D3 [Choice-Type Correlation]: Controlling for the donors’ FOB about Transfer, the
19The correlation between the donors’ FOB and their decision to Give must be regarded with caution.
Although belief elicitation was incentivized, it is possible that donors who planned to Keep may have
underestimated their FOB about Transfer choices to justify their selfish choice. To further test H.D1,
we consider the donors’ rating of the social appropriateness of Embezzle as a proxy for their FOB on
the frequency of Transfer choices because (i) they are significantly correlated (S correlation, rs = −0.19,
p < 0.001), and (ii) we believe that it is more unlikely that donors used their rating of the social
appropriateness of Embezzle, rather than their FOB, as a justification of their choice. We replicate
the correlation with the ratings of the social appropriateness of Embezzle (S correlation, rs = −0.20,
p < 0.001).
20Two donors had a FOB of 0.66 in both conditions and no donor had a FOB of 1 in both conditions.
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frequency of Give choices tends to increase with the donor’s sensitivity to altruism. This holds
in both conditions.
Support for Result D3: We use the Self-Reported Altruism score (Rushton et al., 1981)
as a proxy for our altruism sensitivity parameter. For a given FOB of 0.33, there is a marginally
significant positive correlation between the donors’ Give choices and their altruism score (S
correlation, rs = 0.42, p = 0.081). However, the correlation is not significant when the given
FOB is 0 (S correlation, rs = 0.15, p = 0.313). As for Result D2, we cannot test our hypothesis
with the other two FOB.
[Donor vs. Recipient treatments]: The correlation between the donors’ Give choices and
their altruism score is not different across treatments (Z test, FOB(0): z = −0.93, p = 0.176;
FOB(0.33): z = 0.61, p = 0.270).
4.2 Intermediaries’ Behavior
The comparison of our data to the set of ‘type-belief’ pairs consistent with a Rational interme-
diary (Eq. (13)) shows that our model captures 82.93% of the observed behavior: (i) 46.75% of
the intermediaries always chose Embezzle, (ii) 24.39% switched from Embezzle to Transfer as the
induced SOB increases, i.e., exhibiting guilt aversion, and (iii) 11.79% always chose Transfer,
i.e., exhibiting altruistic preferences prevailing over guilt aversion.21
Focusing on behavior consistent with our theoretical predictions, Figure 5 presents the dis-
tribution of the switching SOB observed in the two treatments and the implications in terms of
predicted altruism sensitivity and guilt sensitivity (see Fig. 3). The distributions of switching
SOB do not differ significantly across treatments (Kruskal-Wallis test, p > 0.10).
21Fig. 3 shows that intermediaries who always choose Transfer for any second-order belief have a
sensitivity to altruism γI > 1/2, but they can also have a sensitivity to guilt θIj > 0. Since we do not
know how many of them have θIj > 0, the fraction of intermediaries exhibiting guilt aversion might be
underestimated in our sample of participants.
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Figure 5: Distribution of the intermediaries’ switching second-order beliefs
Notes: Subjects who did not behave consistently with our theoretical predictions are excluded from this
figure. The figure reads as follows. In the Recipient Treatment, 3% of the intermediaries have a switching
SOB of 1, i.e., they chose Embezzle for an induced SOB in {0; 0.33; 0.66} and Transfer for an induced
SOB of 1. This behavior is consistent with guilt aversion prevailing over altruism only if γI <
1
2 and
1
2 < θIj <
3
4 (see Fig. 3).
The remaining intermediaries behaved as follows: 11.79% of intermediaries switched multiple
times between transferring and embezzling, and 5.28% exhibit an inverse switching pattern from
transferring to embezzling.
Fig. 6 displays, for each condition, the proportion of intermediaries who chose either Transfer
or Embezzle, depending on their induced SOB (see also Table A8 in Appendix A). The figure
illustrates our first two results on the intermediaries’ behavior.
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Figure 6: Distribution of the intermediaries’ choices depending on their induced second-order beliefs
Result I1 [Choice-Belief Correlation]: The higher the intermediaries’ induced SOB about
Transfer, the higher the frequency of Transfer choices. This holds in both conditions.
Support for Result I1: There is a significant positive correlation between the inter-
mediaries’ induced SOB about Transfer and their Transfer choices (S correlation, rs = 0.15,
p < 0.001). The correlation does not vary between conditions (Low: rs = 0.17, p < 0.001; High:
rs = 0.18, p < 0.001).
Note that, if we exclude the intermediaries who believed that no donor would Give in either
condition, the correlation increases to rs = 0.22 (p < 0.001).
Indeed, these excluded intermediaries may suffer from a hypothetical bias, as they are sure
that their choices will not be payoff-relevant, rendering the hypothetical decision to embezzle
less psychologically costly.
So far, we have conducted the analysis by examining the induced SOB based on the menu
method of Khalmetski et al. (2015). If, instead, we use the stated SOB (second-order beliefs
reported directly by the subjects in the third part of the experiment), we find that the correlation
between the intermediaries’ Transfer choices and their stated SOB increases to rs = 0.27 (p <
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0.001). 22 Experiments using stated SOB should not ignore this effect as it leads to an upward-
bias measure of the correlation between SOB and choices (see consistent results in Bellemare
et al., 2017 and Khalmetski et al., 2015 We also find support for Result I1 using a Logit model
with fixed effects (Table A9 in Appendix A) and with random effects and individual controls
(Table A10 in Appendix A).
[Donor vs. Recipient treatments]: The correlation between the intermediaries’ induced SOB
about Transfer and their Transfer choices does not vary significantly across treatments (Donor
treatment: rs = 0.14, p < 0.001; Recipient treatment: rs = 0.15, p < 0.001; Z test, z = 0.05,
p = 0.95) (see also Table A9 and Table A10 in Appendix A).
Result I2 [High vs. Low condition on Choice]: Controlling for the intermediaries’ induced
SOB about Transfer, the frequency of Transfer choices is the same in both conditions.
Support for Result I2: We use MN tests to consider each intermediary as an independent
observation. For a given induced SOB, the frequency of Transfer choices does not significantly
differ across conditions (smallest p = 0.438) (see also Table A10).
[Donor vs. Recipient treatments]: We replicate this result when we distinguish between the
Donor and the Recipient treatments in seven out of eight cases (MN tests for each induced SOB,
smallest p = 0.256), with one exception (Recipient treatment when SOB = 0.33: χ2 = 4.50,
p = 0.033) (see also Table A8 in Appendix A).
Result I3 [Choice-Type Correlation]: The frequency of Transfer choices increases (i) for a
given second-order belief, with the altruism sensitivity, and (ii) for a given second-order belief,
with the guilt sensitivity. Furthermore, the higher the guilt sensitivity, the lower the second-
order belief about Transfer sufficient to switch from Embezzle to Transfer. This holds in both
conditions.
22We interpret this increase as evidence of a false-consensus effect (Ross et al., 1977; Vanberg, 2008).
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Support for Result I3: We consider the Guilt-Negative-Behavior-Evaluation score (Guilt-
NBE score, hereafter) elicited in the pre-experimental survey as a proxy for the guilt-sensitivity
parameter in our model and the Self-Reported Altruism score (Rushton et al., 1981) as a proxy
for the altruism-sensitivity parameter. Table 1 presents (i) the correlation between the Trans-
fer choices, holding the induced SOB constant, and the Guilt-NBE score, (ii) the correlation
between the switching SOB and the Guilt-NBE score, as well as (iii) the correlation between
the Transfer choices, holding the induced SOB constant, and the Altruism score. The switch-
ing SOB corresponds to the minimum induced SOB sufficient to choose Transfer rather than
Embezzle.23
23For an intermediary who always Transfers, the switching SOB is 0; for an intermediary who Embezzles
when the induced SOB is 0 and Transfers when the induced SOB is in {0.33; 0.66; 1}, the switching SOB
is 0.33; etc. We cannot compute a switching SOB for intermediaries who exhibited multiples switches or
an inverse switching pattern.
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Donor treatment Recipient treatment
Guilt Guilt x
Hypoth.
Z-stat Guilt Guilt x
Hypoth.
Z-stat
Transfer | SOB=0 0.10 0.27** -0.95 0.17 0.23* -0.34
Transfer | SOB=0.33 0.19 0.39*** -1.18 0.43*** 0.46*** -0.20
Transfer | SOB=0.66 0.15 0.47*** -1.93** 0.19* 0.43*** -1.44*
Transfer | SOB=1 0.11 0.49*** -2.29** 0.23* 0.52*** -1.84**
Switching SOB -0.14 -0.49*** 2.07*** -0.10 -0.34*** 1.33***
Altruism Altruism
x Hypoth.
Z-stat Altruism Altruism
x Hypoth.
Z-stat
Transfer | SOB=0 -0.01 0.28** -1.60* 0.06 0.14 -0.44
Transfer | SOB=0.33 -0.01 0.35*** -2.02** 0.23*** 0.27*** -0.23
Transfer | SOB=0.66 0.02 0.46*** -2.57*** 0.03 0.25** -1.21
Transfer | SOB=1 -0.08 0.44*** -2.97*** 0.02 0.39*** -2.11**
Notes: This table presents the coefficients of S correlations between row and column variables. *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Rows: “Transfer | SOB = βIj” represents the total number of
Transfer choices in both conditions given that the induced SOB was βIj . “Switching SOB” represents
the switching SOB of intermediaries who either always Embezzle or are guilt-averse. Columns: Guilt
stands for Guilt-NBE score (GASP questionnaire). Altruism stands for Self-Reported Altruism score .
Hypoth. stands for a dummy variable that takes value 0 if the intermediary believes that no donor will
choose Give in either condition, and 1 otherwise. Z-stat stands for the differences between columns
measured by Fisher r-to-Z transformations (one-tailed).
Table 1: Correlation between the intermediaries’ decisions and their Guilt-NBE and Altruism scores
The Guilt-NBE score in itself is only marginally significantly correlated with Transfer choices.
However, the strength of the correlation improves if we interact this score with a dummy vari-
able that takes value 0 if the intermediary believes that no donor will choose Give in either
condition, and 1 otherwise (see Table 1). The same remark holds for Altruism score, although
the improvement is significant only in the Donor Treatment (see Table 1). This suggests that
the Guilt-NBE score and the Self-Reported Altruism score are relevant proxies for, respectively,
the guilt-sensitivity and altruism-sensitivity parameters only when intermediaries believe their
decision will be implemented with a non-null probability.
[Donor vs. Recipient treatments]: The magnitude of this correlation is lower in the Donor
treatment than in the Recipient treatment, but not significantly so (Z tests, smallest p = 0.143).
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Result I4 [Donor vs. Recipient]: All our hypotheses hold independently of whether guilt is
directed toward the donor or toward the recipient.
Support for Result I4: For each result I1–I3 above, see (the absence of) treatment differ-
ence under the label [Donor vs. Recipient treatments].
4.3 A Structural Estimate of Guilt Sensitivity
Following Bellemare et al. (2011), we define a structural econometric model to estimate the
intermediaries’ average guilt-sensitivity parameter, θIj , toward the donor (j = D, in the Donor
treatment) and the recipient (j = R, in the Recipient treatment).24 Given the treatment, for
each αjI and each condition (eight cases per intermediary), intermediaries choose sI (Transfer
or Embezzle) to maximize their utility after Give, as defined by Equation (14) (Random Utility
Model). In this equation, λ is the noise parameter that we estimate, and UI is defined following
our modeling of guilt aversion toward the donor or the recipient (Eq. 6): UI(θIj , sI |sD =
G,αjI) = 1 ·MI(G, sI)− θIj ·max{0,Ej [r(sI)|sD = G]− r(sI)} in the Low and High condition,
for αjI ∈ {0, 1/3, 2/3, 1}, and j ∈ {D,R}:
VI(θIj , λ, sI) = UI(θIj , sI) + λ · I(sI) (14)
We used a conditional Logit model to estimate θIj , the coefficient corresponding to the guilt
sensitivity parameter, and λ, the noise parameter, while fixing to 1 the coefficient corresponding
to the intermediary’s own material payoff. Table 2 reports the results of these estimates.
24Recall that, in our theoretical model, we also introduce a parameter which represents the altruism
sensitivity, γI (see Eq. (7)). However, the second component of the intermediary’s feeling of altruism
AIR, i.e., the recipient’s received amount r(sI), is colinear with the intermediary’s material payoff (by
construction of the Mini-Games): r(sI) = 2 · [25−(MI(sI)−80)] in both conditions. Therefore, we cannot
estimate the three coefficients (γI , θIj , and the coefficient corresponding to MI) of our theoretical utility
function while estimating the noise parameter of our random utility model (Eq. (14)). We renounce to
estimate γI .
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All treatments Donor
treatment
Recipient
treatment
Subjects with Hypothetical
Bias Excluded
θIj -0.37*** -0.34*** -0.41*** -0.61***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
λ 6.48*** 5.80*** 7.32*** 8.30
(0.42) (0.51) (0.74) (0.79)
N 123 62 61 83
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 2: Structural estimates of the guilt-sensitivity parameter
The results reported in Table 2 show that the average intermediary is willing to pay 0.37
ECU to avoid letting down another player by 1 ECU (difference between expectations and actual
outcome). When we exclude intermediaries who believed that no donor chose to Give (those
intermediaries who are potentially subject to a hypothetical bias), the estimated guilt-sensitivity
parameter increases up to 0.61.
[Donor vs. Recipient treatments]: Although intermediaries seem to be slightly more sensitive
to guilt toward the recipient than toward the donor (+20%), the difference is not significant (Z
test, z = −1.09, p = 0.13; see Paternoster et al. (1998)).
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this study we investigated theoretically and experimentally the role of guilt aversion in the
behavior of intermediaries confronted with an opportunity to embezzle a donation. Using psy-
chological game theory, our aim was to determine (i) whether others’ expectations influence the
decision to embezzle, and (ii) whether the impact of others’ expectations on behavior differs if
others are the donors or the potential recipients of the donation. Extending BD (2007) model
to capture guilt aversion toward the donor and documenting its existence and features in a lab-
oratory experiment are our two original contributions. Indeed, we have modeled a new direction
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of guilt whose existence was not documented yet: guilt directed toward a player whose payoffs
cannot be affected by the agent’s decision. The recent experimental literature on guilt aversion
has often pursued three separate objectives: measuring the prevalence of guilt aversion in the
population and its magnitude, and identifying a survey-based measure of guilt aversion. We are
the first to address these three questions in a single paper.
We find that (i) on average, about 25 % of the intermediaries are affected by others’ ex-
pectations in the way predicted by our guilt-aversion model, and the proportion of guilt-averse
intermediaries is not affected by the direction of guilt; (ii) on average, an intermediary is willing
to pay 0.37 ECU not to let down another player by 1 ECU, and the intensity of the structurally
estimated guilt-sensitivity parameter is not significantly different when the intermediary is con-
fronted with the recipient’s expectations (0.41) compared to the donor’s expectations (0.34).
Thus, guilt aversion has the same effect on intermediaries, regardless of whether the intermedi-
ary considers a person that may be financially harmed by his decision or a person that he may
betray but without any monetary consequences.
Our results contribute to the recent strand of the literature aiming at estimating the pro-
portion of guilt-averse individuals in the population — a literature so far limited to Dictator
games (see Table B1 in Appendix B). Our structural estimates of guilt sensitivity are in the
same range of values as those obtained by Bellemare et al. (2011, 2018) through structural es-
timations (see Table B2 in Appendix B). Finally, we report a significant positive correlation
between the intermediaries’ switching second-order beliefs and their Guilt-Negative-Behavior-
Evaluation score, but only when intermediaries believe that their decision will be implemented
with a non-null probability that they are not playing hypothetically. This finding contributes
to the small literature trying to identify the link between survey-based measures of guilt and
experimental decisions (see Table B3 in Appendix B). Overall, this calls for more research on
the nature of the emotions embedded in BD (2007) model of guilt-aversion.
These findings highlight that psychological game theory can contribute usefully to the re-
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newal of the analysis of dishonesty by a better understanding of the moral costs of unethical
behavior. We measured guilt aversion toward the donor and toward the recipient in two separate
treatments. A straightforward extension would be to test a treatment in which intermediaries
would be informed about both donors’ and recipients’ expectations. This would lead to a com-
plex design, though. By enlarging the perspective to a dynamic setting, we could also contribute
to explain the emergence of a vicious circle of corrupt norms. If donors or recipients expect a
high level of embezzlement in a group, intermediaries can embezzle without feeling guilty, which
in turn increases the expectations of embezzlement.
If the results on intermediaries’ guilt aversion in the lab hold in the field, anti-corruption poli-
cies could publicize the high expectations of donors and recipients to the intermediaries. Public
campaigns of information (Reinikka and Svensson, 2011) or framing manipulations (Ockenfels
and Werner, 2014) usually focus on the potential recipients’ expectations. Policies should also
consider the sensitiveness of intermediaries to the donors’ expectations (see also the literature
on trust-responsiveness, e.g., Bacharach et al., 2007; Guerra and Zizzo, 2004). But of course,
identifying guilt aversion in the lab does not prove that it exists to the same extent in the field.
In the field there may be an asymmetry in guilt aversion because the hierarchy of status or power
adds to the inequality of payoffs that we introduced in our experiment (for example, donors are
sometimes a corrupt and exploitative government dealing with other people’s money; thus, guilt
toward the recipients may be much stronger than toward the donor). Note that
previous studies on bribery found no difference in behavior in the field and in the lab (Ar-
mantier and Boly, 2013) and that dishonesty in the lab correlates with dishonesty of the same
individuals in the field (Dai et al., 2018). Future research should usefully test the qualitative
and quantitative external validity of our results. A major challenge, though, will be to measure
beliefs in the field.
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A Additional Tables
Session Participants Age Women Previous Exp. Economics Stud.
(#) (n) (mean) (%) (mean) (%)
Donor Treatment
5 18 21.27 50.00 1.44 66.67
6 18 21.00 72.22 0.22 33.33
7 15 24.20 53.33 1.53 33.33
8 21 22.00 90.48 0.80 28.57
9 21 21.28 42.86 1.80 71.43
12 24 23.25 50.00 1.33 45.83
13 18 20.66 55.56 1.50 61.11
15 21 21.19 47.82 1.00 38.10
16 12 21.00 50.00 2.50 50.00
18 15 22.40 46.67 1.86 33.33
Sub-total 183 21.83 56.28 1.34 46.45
Recipient Treatment
1 18 21.77 22.22 1.16 77.78
2 21 19.76 61.90 0.90 57.14
3 15 20.93 40.00 0.26 80.00
4 21 20.85 57.14 1.14 52.38
10 18 22.88 72.22 1.16 61.11
11 27 22.30 50.00 1.96 62.96
14 24 21.50 37.50 2.20 54.17
17 27 24.59 40.74 2.70 55.56
19 15 21.00 66.67 2.46 46.67
Sub-total 186 21.87 49.18 1.63 60.22
Treatment
Difference
No1 No2 No1 Yes2***
Total 369 21.85 52.72 1.49 53.39
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
1 Mann-Whitney ranks sum tests; 2 Fisher exact test
Table A1: Summary statistics of participants per session
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Low z-stat High z-stat
On the donors’ behavior
Intermediaries’ FOB on the frequency of Give choices a 0.39
0.42
0.37
-0.21
Donors’ SOB on intermediaries’ FOB a 0.40 0.35
Recipients’ FOB on the frequency of Give choices a 0.40
-0.76
0.36
-0.30
Donors’ SOB on recipients’ FOB a 0.37 0.34
Social Norm on Give b 0.88
-16.10***
0.84
-15.78***
Social Norm on Keep b -0.48 -0.43
On the intermediaries’ behavior
Donors’ FOB on the frequency of Transfer choices a 0.20
-4.72***
0.25
-2.14**
Intermediaries’ SOB on donors’ FOB a 0.36 0.27
Recipients’ FOB on the frequency of Transfer choices a 0.21
3.15**
0.27
1.24
Intermediaries’ SOB on recipients’ FOB a 0.30 0.29
Social Norm on Transfer b 0.89
-14.45***
0.90
-15.74***
Social Norm on Embezzle b 0.19 -0.18
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
a Average beliefs on the frequency of choices are rated on scale from 0 (never) to 1 (always).
Differences between FOB and SOB are measured by Mann-Whitney rank sum tests.
b Average social norms are rated on a scale from − 1 (very socially inappropriate) to 1 (very
socially appropriate). Differences between social norms are measured by Wilcoxon signed rank
tests.
Table A2: Summary statistics on beliefs and social norms
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Low Condition High Condition
% n % n
Give | FOB=0 27.54% 19 24.53% 13
Give | FOB=0.33 66.67% 24 43.75% 21
Give | FOB=0.66 94.12% 16 50.00% 10
Give | FOB=1 100% 1 50.00% 1
Notes: For each condition, a donor makes one choice given his FOB, e.g., in the Low condition,
among the donors whose FOB was 0.33, 66.67% chose Give.
Table A3: Donors’ Give choices for a given FOB on the frequency of Transfer choices
(Keep, Keep) FOB = 0 FOB = 0.33 FOB = 0.66 FOB = 1
Prediction n Prediction n Prediction n Prediction n
FOB = 0 γD <
5
4 34 γD <
15
14 10 γD <
15
22 1 γD <
1
2 0
FOB = 0.33 γD <
5
6 4 γD <
5
6 4 γD <
15
22 3 γD <
1
2 0
FOB = 0.66 γD <
5
8 0 γD <
5
8 1 γD <
5
8 0 γD <
1
2 0
FOB = 1 γD <
1
2 0 γD <
1
2 0 γD <
1
2 0 γD <
1
2 0
Notes: The table reads as follows. 10 donors chose to Keep in the Low condition and
to Keep in the High condition while having a FOB of 0 about Transfer choices in
the Low condition and a FOB of 0.33 about Transfer choices in the High condition.
This behavior is consistent with our theoretical predictions only if γD <
15
14 .
Table A4: Matching the donors’ behavior to our predictions - (Keep, Keep)
(Give, Keep) FOB = 0 FOB = 0.33 FOB = 0.66 FOB = 1
Prediction n Prediction n Prediction n Prediction n
FOB = 0 54 < γD <
5
2 0 No 1 No 0 No 0
FOB = 0.33 56 < γD <
5
2 2
5
6 < γD <
15
14 7 No 5 No 0
FOB = 0.66 58 < γD <
5
2 0
5
8 < γD <
15
14 4
5
8 < γD <
15
22 1 No 1
FOB = 1 12 < γD <
5
2 0
1
2 < γD <
15
22 0
1
2 < γD <
15
14 0 No 0
Notes: the table reads as in Table A4. ”No” means that there exists no value of γD
leading to a (Give,Keep) prediction for the specific pair of beliefs in the two conditions.
Table A5: Matching the donors’ behavior to our predictions - (Give, Keep)
(Give, Give) FOB = 0 FOB = 0.33 FOB = 0.66 FOB = 1
Prediction n Prediction n Prediction n Prediction n
FOB = 0 52 < γD 11
5
4 < γD 4
5
4 < γD 3
5
4 < γD 0
FOB = 0.33 52 < γD 0
15
14 < γD 6
5
6 < γD 4
5
6 < γD 0
FOB = 0.66 52 < γD 1
15
14 < γD 7
15
22 < γD 1
5
8 < γD 1
FOB = 1 52 < γD 0
15
14 < γD 0
15
22 < γD 1
1
2 < γD 0
Notes: the table reads as in Table A4. ”No” means that there exists no value of γD
leading to a (Give,Give) prediction for the specific pair of beliefs in the two conditions.
Table A6: Matching the donors’ behavior to our predictions - (Give, Give)
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(Keep, Give) FOB = 0 FOB = 0.33 FOB = 0.66 FOB = 1
Prediction n Prediction n Prediction n Prediction n
FOB = 0 No 1 1514 < γD <
5
4 3
15
22 < γD <
5
4 1
1
2 < γD <
5
4 0
FOB = 0.33 No 0 No 1 1522 < γD <
5
6 0
1
2 < γD <
5
6 0
FOB = 0.66 No 0 No 0 No 0 12 < γD <
5
8 0
FOB = 1 No 0 No 0 No 0 No 0
Notes: the table reads as in Table A4. ”No” means that there exists no value of γD
leading to a (Keep,Give) prediction for the specific pair of beliefs in the two conditions.
Table A7: Matching the donors’ behavior to our predictions - (Keep, Give)
Low Condition High Condition
% n % n
Transfer | SOB=0 21.95% 27 21.95% 27
Transfer | SOB=0.33 25.20% 31 27.76% 28
Transfer | SOB=0.66 33.33% 41 32.52% 40
Transfer | SOB=1 42.28% 52 43.09% 53
Notes: For each condition, an intermediary makes four choices given each induced SOB, e.g., in
the Low condition, when the induced SOB was 0.33, 25.20% of intermediaries chose Transfer.
Table A8: Intermediaries’ Transfer choices for a given induced SOB
All
treatments
Donor
treatment
Recipient
treatment
Hypothetical
Bias Excluded
All
treatments
Induced SOB 0.67*** 0.62*** 0.75*** 0.81***
(0.09) (0.12) (0.14) (0.11)
Low Condition 0.06 0.21 0.13 0.10 -0.24
(0.20) (0.26) (0.30) (0.22) (0.52)
Stated SOB 1.27**
(0.63)
# Observations 472 256 216 400 42
# Participants 59 32 27 50 21
Notes: In the first four columns, the dependent variable is the decision to Transfer made for a given
induced SOB (using the menu method). In the last column, the dependent variable is the decision to
Transfer made when the induced SOB corresponded to the stated SOB (the SOB reported directly
by the intermediaries in the third part of the experiment). Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table A9: Regression on the decision to Transfer (Logit model with fixed effects)
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All
treatments
Donor
treatment
Recipient
treatment
Hypothetical
Bias Excluded
All
treatments
Induced SOB 0.75*** 0.74*** 0.76*** 0.90***
(0.10) (0.13) (0.15) (0.11)
Low Condition 0.08 0.27 -0.13 0.13 -0.04
(0.20) (0.28) (0.30) (0.23) (0.47)
Donor Treatment -0.94 -0.54 -0.93
(0.60) (0.61) (0.77)
Stated SOB 2.16***
(0.54)
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Observations 876 488 488 656 244
# Participants 122 61 61 82 122
Notes: In the four first columns, the dependent variable is the decision to Transfer made for a given
induced SOB. In the last column, the dependent variable is the decision to Transfer made when the
induced SOB corresponded to the stated SOB. Individual controls are: age, gender, guilt-NBE score,
fairness score. Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table A10: Regression on the decision to Transfer (Logit model with random effects)
Correlation between ... Risk-Aversion
FOB on Donors’ Behavior (Low condition) 0.06
FOB on Donors’ Behavior (High condition) 0.09
FOB on Intermediaries’ Behavior (Low condition) 0.04
FOB on Intermediaries’ Behavior (High condition) -0.02
N=123; Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
Table A11: Correlation between recipients’ beliefs and recipients’ risk aversion
Low condition (χ2) High condition (χ2)
Social Norm on Give 4.17 2.59
Social Norm on Keep 3.61 2.39
Social Norm on Transfer 0.21 1.75
Social Norm on Embezzle 6.89** 0.97
Notes: Kruskal-Wallis tests. Standard errors in parentheses; * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p < 0.01.
a: The mean of the intermediaries (0.11) is smaller than the mean of the donors (0.28) (t-test, p <0.05).
Table A12: Kruskal-Wallis tests of the difference in social norms distributions across roles
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B Previous Literature
Study Game % N
Khalmetski et al. (2015) Dictator 37% 191
Balafoutas and Fornwagner (2017) Dictator 18% 108
Bellemare et al. (2018) Dictator ≈ 65% 140
Our results Embezzlement 25% 123
Table B1: Previous estimations of the proportion of guilt-averse individuals
Study Game Estimation Treatment θi N
Bellemare et al. (2011) Proposal and
Structural
Dictators’ SOB 0.4 1078
Response Recipients’ FOB 0.8 540
Dictator Structural
Stake-independent 0.1 84
Bellemare et al. (2018) Low Stakes 0.4 56
Medium Stakes 0.6 56
High Stakes 1 56
Patel and Smith
(2019)
Participation Equilibrium 0.1 111
Equilibrium
Baseline 2.3 90
Tempting to coop. 1.8 92
Peeters and Vorsatz
(2018)
Prisonner Tempting to def. 2.5 96
Dilemma Hypothetical
BDM
Baseline. 3.1 90
Tempting to coop. 2.1 92
Tempting to def. 3.5 96
Our results Embezzlement Structural
Toward Donor 0.34 61
Toward Recipient 0.41 62
Table B2: Previous estimations of the guilt-sensitivity parameter
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Correlation between ...
Study Game Trait Behavior p < 0.1 N
Bracht and
Regner (2013)
Trust Guilt-NBE Pro-social choice Yes 192
Regner and
Harth (2014)
Trust Moulton’s a Pro-social choice Yes 127
Peeters and
Vorsatz (2018)
Prisonner
Dilemma
Guilt-NBE Estimated θ No 68
Our results Embezzlement Guilt-NBE
Pro-social choice Yes/No
123
Switching SOB Yes/No
Notes: a Regner and Harth (2014) used a one question out of the three included in the original
measure of Moulton et al. (1966): ”How easy is it for something to make you feel guilty? (1) very
easy, (2) easy, (3) difficult, (4) very difficult”.
Table B3: Previous correlation of personality traits and behavioral outcomes
C Online Appendices
C.1 Instructions for the lab experiment [Translated from French]
OVERVIEW OF THE SESSION
Thank you for participating in this experimental session on decision-making. During this
session, you can earn money. The amount of your earnings depends both on your decisions and
on other participants’ decisions. At the end of the session, you will receive your earnings in
cash, in a separate room to ensure the confidentiality of your earnings. The earnings you will
receive include:
• your earnings from today’s experimental session
• a e7 fee for having completed the online questionnaire and for showing-up on time
During the session, we will sometimes use ECU (Experimental Currency Units). The conversion
rate from ECU into Euro is the following: 10 ECU = e1.2.
Please turn off your phone. During the session, any communication with other participants is
forbidden. If you have any questions, raise your hand or press the red button on the side of your
desk. We will come answer to your questions in private.
At the beginning of the session, the program will form groups of three participants. You will
never know the identity of the other two members of your group, and they will never know your
identity. All your decisions and earnings are anonymous.
In each group, participants have a different role. There is:
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• a donor
• an intermediary
• a recipient
Your screen will indicate your role when the session begins and you will keep the same role
throughout the session.
There are two possible situations: situation A and situation B. You will take your decisions in
both situations. At every moment, the situation in which you are will always be displayed on
the screen.
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Short description of the roles
ROLE OF THE DONOR
The donor receives an initial endowment of 150 ECU.
The donor’s task is to choose how many ECU to give to the recipient.
For each situation, the donor decides either:
• to give 25 ECU to the recipient
• or to give 0 ECU to the recipient
Regardless of the situation, his/her payoff is equal to: 150 ECU – the ECU given.
Important : The donor cannot give ECU directly to the recipient. Only the intermediary can
transfer the ECU given by the donor to the recipient.
ROLE OF THE INTERMEDIARY
The intermediary receives an initial endowment of 80 ECU.
The intermediary’s task is to transfer the entirety of the ECU given by the donor to the
recipient.
• If the donor has given 25 ECU:
In situation A, the intermediary can decide either:
– to transfer the entirety of the 25 ECU to the recipient
– or to transfer 10 ECU to the recipient and keep 15 ECU for himself/herself
In situation B, the intermediary can decide either:
– to transfer the entirety of the 25 ECU to the recipient
– or to transfer 5 ECU to the recipient and keep 20 ECU for himself/herself
• If the donor has given 0 ECU: The intermediary does not make any decision.
Regardless of the situation, his/her payoff is equal to: 80 ECU + the ECU kept for him-
self/herself.
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Important: For every ECU transferred to the recipient by the intermediary, the recipient receives
2 ECU. For example, if the intermediary transfers 25 ECU, the recipient receives 50 ECU; if the
intermediary transfers 5 ECU, the recipient receives 10 ECU.
ROLE OF THE RECIPIENT
The recipient receives an initial endowment of 10 ECU.
The recipient does not make any decision.
Regardless of the situation, his/her payoff is equal to: 10 ECU + (2 x the number of ECU
transferred by the intermediary).
Short description of the stages
The session is composed of four stages:
• Stage 1: All the participants answer some questions.
• Stage 2: The donor makes his/her decisions.
• Stage 3: The intermediary makes his/her decisions.
• Stage 4: All the participants answer some questions.
At the end of the session:
• All the participants are informed of the randomly selected situation, of the decisions made
by the group members in the randomly selected situation, and of their personal earnings.
• All the participants have to complete a final questionnaire.
Personal Login
When I have finished reading these instructions, please enter your personal login on your screen.
It corresponds to the personal login you created yourself when you completed the online ques-
tionnaire. As a reminder: we advised you to use “Your mother’s or father’s first name – his/her
day of birth – his/her month of birth” without space or dash. If your mother is called Brigitte
and she was born on a 19th of May, it yields ”Brigitte1905”. Once you have entered your per-
sonal login, click ”Continue”.
Comprehension Questionnaire
You have to complete a comprehension questionnaire. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand or press the red button. We will come answer to your questions in private.
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***
Once all participants have completed the comprehension questionnaire, the session will start.
The role that has been randomly assigned to you will be displayed on your screen. You will then
receive more detailed instructions.
[The next set of instructions was distributed after the comprehension questionnaire.]
STAGE 1
In this stage, all the participants have to answer to some questions.
If you are an intermediary or a recipient: You will have to answer the following question: “Among
3 donors randomly selected in today’s session, in your opinion how many of these donors will
give 25 ECU to the recipient?”. You have to enter a number between 0 and 3, inclusive.
You have to answer this question twice: once in situation A, and once in situation B.
If you are a donor or a recipient: You will have to answer to the following question: “Among
3 intermediaries randomly selected in today’s session, if their donor decides to give 25 ECU to
the recipient, in your opinion how many of these intermediaries will transfer the 25 ECU to the
recipient?”.
You have to answer to this question twice: once in situation A, and once in situation B.
In total,
1. If you are a donor, you have to answer two questions about the intermediaries’ decisions
(in situation A and in situation B);
2. If you are an intermediary, you have to answer two questions about the donors’ decisions
(in situation A and in situation B);
3. If you are a recipient, you have to answer two questions about the donors’ decisions (in
situation A and in situation B) and two questions about the intermediaries’ decisions (in
situation A and in situation B).
How do the answers affect your earnings?
At the end of the session, for each role, one of the questions to which you have answered will
be randomly selected. If your answer to that question corresponds to what truly happened, you
will earn 1.
Example: Suppose you are a recipient and the question randomly selected is “In situation B,
among 3 donors randomly selected in today’s session, in your opinion, how many of these donors
52
will choose to give 25 ECU toward the recipient?”. The program randomly select 3 donors among
the participants to todays’ session. If in situation B, x donor(s) among the 3 randomly selected
ones, has/have given 25 ECU toward the recipient, then you answer is correct if you answered
“x“.
STAGE 2
In this stage, the donors make their decisions.
If you are an intermediary or a recipient, you do not make any decision in this stage.
If you are a donor, your task is to decide whether to give 25 ECU or 0 ECU to the recipient.
In total, you have to make two decisions: one in situation A, and one in situation B. However,
only one decision will count to determine the payoff of the group members.
Important : When you make your decisions, you do not know which one of your decision will
count. You should give the same weight to each of these decisions since you do not know which
one will determine the payoffs of the group members.
Which of the donor’s decisions determine the payoffs of the group members?
At the end of the session, the computer program will randomly select situation A or situation
B. The donor’s decision that will count is the decision that was made in the selected situation.
How does the donor’s decision affect the payoffs of the group members?
If the donor has chosen to give 0 ECU to the recipient in the randomly selected situation, the
payoff of each group member is the following:
• The donor’s payoff is 150 ECU.
• The intermediary’s payoff is 80 ECU.
• The recipient’s payoff is 10 ECU.
If the donor has chosen to give 25 ECU to the recipient in the randomly selected situation:
• The donor’s payoff is 125 ECU.
• - The intermediary’s and the recipient’s payoffs depend on the intermediary’s decisions in
the third stage.
At the end of the session, you will be informed of the donor’s decision in the randomly selected
situation.
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***
If you have any question, please raise your hand or press the red button. We will come answer
to your questions in private.
[The next set of instructions was distributed after stages 1 and 2.]
STAGE 3
In this stage, the intermediaries make their decisions.
If you are a donor or a recipient, you do not make any decision in this stage.
If you are an intermediary, your task is to transfer the entirety of the ECU given by the donor
to the recipient.
You have to make several decisions. Look at the screenshot below. There are two pieces of in-
formation in bold characters on the screen: these are the two pieces of information that change
for each of the decisions.
Figure 7: Screenshot for the *Donor Treatment*
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Figure 8: Screenshot for the *Recipient Treatment*
• Information on the situation
You have to make a decision in both situation A and situation B. The order of appearance of
these situations on your screen is random.
• Information on your *donor*/*recipient*’s guess
Remember that in the first stage the *donor*/*recipient* in your group has answered to the
following question: “Among 3 intermediaries randomly selected in today’s session, if their donor
decides to give 25 ECU to the recipient, in your opinion how many of these intermediaries will
transfer the 25 ECU to the recipient?”. There were four possible answers: 0, 1, 2 or 3. You have
to make a decision for each of the possible answers.
When you make your decisions, you do not know how many ECU the donor in your group has
decided to give to the recipient. You have to make your decisions assuming that the donor has
given 25 ECU.
In total, you have to make eight decisions: four decisions corresponding to the four possible an-
swers of the *donor*/*recipient* in your group in situation A, and four decisions corresponding
to the four possible answers of the *donor*/*recipient* in your group in situation B.
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Important: When you make your decisions, you do not know which one of your decision will
count. You should give the same weight to each of your decisions since you do not know which
one will determine the payoff of the group members.
Which of the intermediary’s decisions will determine the payoff of the group mem-
bers?
• If the donor has chosen to give 0 ECU to the recipient: none of the intermediary’s decisions
will determine the payoff of the group members.
• If the donor has chosen to give 25 ECU to the recipient: one of the intermediary’s decisions
will determine the payoff of the group members.
At the end of the session, the computer program will randomly select situation A or situation
B. Among the intermediary’s decisions made in the randomly selected situation, the computer
program selects the decision corresponding to the answer given by the *donor*/*recipient* of
your group in the first stage. It is this decision that determines the payoff of the group members.
Example: Suppose that the program randomly selects situation A. Suppose then that, to the
question “In situation B, among 3 intermediaries randomly selected in today’s session, if their
donor decides to give 25 ECU to the recipient, in your opinion how many of these intermediaries
will transfer 25 ECU to the recipient?”, the *donor*/*recipient* of your group has answered
“x”. Then, the program selects the decision made by the intermediary when his/her screen
displayed “Situation B” and “Your *donor*/*recipient* believes that x intermediaries among 3
randomly selected today will transfer 25 ECU.”
How does the intermediary’s decision affect the payoff of the group members?
If the donor has given 25 ECU to the recipient in the randomly selected situation, one of the
intermediary’s decisions determines the payoffs of the group members.
The intermediary may have made three types of decisions:
• Regardless of the situation, if the intermediary transfers 25 ECU to the recipient, the
intermediary’s payoff is 80 ECU and the recipient’s payoff is 60 ECU.
• If situation A is randomly selected and if the intermediary transfers 10 ECU to the recip-
ient and keeps 15 ECU for himself/herself, the intermediary’s payoff is 95 ECU and the
recipient’s payoff is 30 ECU.
• If situation B is randomly selected and if the intermediary transfers 5 ECU to the recipi-
ent and keeps 20 ECU for himself/herself, the intermediary’s payoff is 100 ECU and the
recipient’s payoff is 20 ECU.
At the end of the session, you will be informed of the donor’s decision in the randomly selected
situation.
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***
If you have any questions, please raise your hand or press the red button. We will come answer
to your questions in private.
[The next set of instructions was distributed after the stage 3]
STAGE 4
1) First, all the participants have to answer to questions of type 1.
You have to evaluate the different possible decisions of a donor and of an intermediary. More
precisely, for each possible decision of a donor or of an intermediary, you are asked to indicate
whether this decision is socially appropriate and consistent with moral or proper social behavior,
or socially inappropriate and inconsistent with moral or proper behavior.
Consider that a decision is socially appropriate if the majority of people agree to say that it is
the correct or ethical thing to do. You have to rate each decision using the following scale: very
socially inappropriate, somewhat socially inappropriate, somewhat socially appropriate or very
socially appropriate.
2) Then, the donor and the intermediary have to answer to questions of type 2.
You are asked to guess the decision made by a participant earlier in the session.
How do the answers affect your earnings?
At the end of the session, for each role, the program will randomly select one of the questions
to which you have answered in this stage. If you are a recipient, the randomly selected question
is for sure a question of type 1. If you are a donor or an intermediary, the question randomly
selected can be a question of type 1 or a question of type 2.
• If the randomly selected question is a question of type 1:
Your earning depends on the answers of the other participants in the same role as you in to-
day’s session. The computer program determines the answer given by the highest number of
participants in the same role as you (you included) to this question. You earn 1 if your answer
corresponds to the answer the most frequently given by participants in the same role as you. In
case of a tie between two answers, the program randomly selects one of the tie answers.
Example: Suppose there are six participants in today’s session who have the role of donors.
A question of type 1 is randomly selected. To that question, one donor has answered “ very
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socially inappropriate”, two donors have answered “somewhat socially appropriate” and three
donors have answered “very socially appropriate”. The answer the most frequently given by the
donors is “very socially appropriate”. Then, the three donors who have answered “very socially
appropriate” earn 1, the other donors earn nothing.
• If the randomly selected question is a question of type 1:
If you have guessed correctly a previous decision, you earn 1.
END OF THE SESSION
At the end of the session, you will be informed of the situation randomly selected, of the de-
cisions made by your group members in the randomly selected situation, and of your personal
payoff. Then, you will be asked to complete a final questionnaire.
At the end of the session, please remain seated and silent until an experimenter invites you to
proceed to the payment room. At this moment, bring only your computer tag and your payment
receipt completed with you.
***
If you have any questions, please raise your hand or press the red button. We will come answer
your questions in private.
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C.2 Online Questionnaire [Translated from French]
PART 0 - Introduction
Thank you for accepting to answer this questionnaire in order to complete your registration to
the experiment. Answering to this questionnaire will take approximately 10 minutes. Please read
carefully each sentence and remain concentrated. We are interested in your genuine answers,
not what you think you should answer.
PART 1 - GASP Questionnaire (Cohen et al., 2011)
Here are situations that people are likely to encounter in day-to-day life, followed by common
reactions to those situations. As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation.
Please indicate the likelihood that you would react in the way described by using the following
categories: (1) Very Unlikely, (2) Unlikely, (3) Slightly Likely, (4) Unlikely, (5) About 50%
Likely, (6) Slightly Likely, (7) Very Likely.
1. After realizing you have received too much change at a store, you decide to keep it because
the salesclerk does not notice. What is the likelihood that you would feel uncomfortable
about keeping the money?
2. You are privately informed that you are the only one in your group that did not make the
honor society because you skipped too many days of school. What is the likelihood that
this would lead you to become more responsible about attending school?
3. You rip an article out of a journal in the library and take it with you. Your teacher
discovers what you did and tells the librarian and your entire class. What is the likelihood
that this would make you would feel like a bad person?
4. After making a big mistake on an important project at work in which people were depend-
ing on you, your boss criticizes you in front of your co-workers. What is the likelihood
that you would feign sickness and leave work?
5. You reveal a friend’s secret, though your friend never finds out. What is the likelihood
that your failure to keep the secret would lead you to exert extra effort to keep secrets in
the future?
6. You give a bad presentation at work. Afterwards your boss tells your co-workers it was
your fault that your company lost the contract. What is the likelihood that you would
feel incompetent?
7. A friend tells you that you boast a great deal. What is the likelihood that you would stop
spending time with that friend?
8. Your home is very messy and unexpected guests knock on your door and invite themselves
in. What is the likelihood that you would avoid the guests until they leave?
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9. You secretly commit a felony. What is the likelihood that you would feel remorse about
breaking the law?
10. You successfully exaggerate your damages in a lawsuit. Months later, your lies are dis-
covered and you are charged with perjury. What is the likelihood that you would think
you are a despicable human being?
11. You strongly defend a point of view in a discussion, and though nobody was aware of it,
you realize that you were wrong. What is the likelihood that this would make you think
more carefully before you speak?
12. You take office supplies home for personal use and are caught by your boss. What is the
likelihood that this would lead you to quit your job?
13. You make a mistake at work and find out a co-worker is blamed for the error. Later, your
co-worker confronts you about your mistake. What is the likelihood that you would feel
like a coward?
14. At a co-worker’s housewarming party, you spill red wine on their new cream-colored carpet.
You cover the stain with a chair so that nobody notices your mess. What is the likelihood
that you would feel that the way you acted was pathetic?
15. While discussing a heated subject with friends, you suddenly realize you are shouting
though nobody seems to notice. What is the likelihood that you would try to act more
considerately toward your friends?
16. You lie to people but they never find out about it. What is the likelihood that you would
feel terrible about the lies you told?
Guilt Negative-Behavior-Evaluation (NBE) 1, 9, 14, 16
Guilt Repair (R) 2, 5, 11, 15
Shame Negative-Self-Evaluation (NSE) 3, 6, 10, 13
Shame Withdraw (W) 4, 7, 8, 12
Table B4: GASP Questionnaire - Answers Key
PART 2 - Honesty-Humility Scale from the 100-items HEXACO Personality
Inventory - Revised (Lee and Ashton, 2004)
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with these statements about you by using the
following categories: (1) Strongly disagree, (2) Disagree, (3) Neutral (neither agree nor disagree),
(4) Agree, (5) Strongly disagree.
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1. If I want something from a person I dislike, I will act very nicely toward that person in
order to get it.
2. If I knew that I could never get caught, I would be willing to steal a million dollars.
3. Having a lot of money is not especially important to me.
4. I am an ordinary person who is no better than others are.
5. I would not use flattery to get a raise or promotion at work, even if I thought it would
succeed.
6. I would be tempted to buy stolen property if I were financially tight.
7. I would like to live in a very expensive, high-class neighborhood.
8. I would not want people to treat me as though I were superior to them.
9. If I want something from someone, I will laugh at that person’s worst jokes.
10. I would never accept a bribe, even if it were very large.
11. I would like to be seen driving around in a very expensive car.
12. I think that I am entitled to more respect than the average person is.
13. I would not pretend to like someone just to get that person to do favors for me.
14. I would be tempted to use counterfeit money, if I were sure I could get away with it.
15. I would get a lot of pleasure from owning expensive luxury goods.
16. I want people to know that I am an important person of high status.
Sincerity 1R, 5, 9R, 13
Fairness 2R, 6R, 10, 14R
Greed-Avoidance 3, 7R, 11R, 15R
Modesty 4, 8, 12R, 16R
Table B5: Honesty-Humility Scale - Answers Key25
PART 3 – Inspired by the Self Report Altruism Scale (Rushton et al., 1981)26
Please indicate the frequency with which you have carried out the following acts by using the
following categories: (1) Never, (2) Once, (3) More than once, (4) Often, (5) Very Often.
26Three items were excluded: “I have made change for a stranger”, “I have given a stranger a lift in
my car” and “I have bought ‘charity” Christmas cards deliberately because I knew it was a good cause”.
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1. I have helped a stranger change a flat tire.27
2. I have given directions to a stranger.
3. I have given money, goods or clothes to a charity.28
4. I have delayed an elevator and held the door open for a stranger.
5. I have donated blood.
6. I have helped carry a stranger’s belongings (books, parcels, etc.).
7. I have allowed someone to go ahead of me in a lineup (at photocopy machine, in the
supermarket).
8. I have pointed out a clerk’s error (in a bank, at the supermarket) in undercharging me for
an item.
9. I have let a neighbor whom I did not know too well borrow an item of some value to me
(e.g., a dish, tools, etc.)
10. I have done volunteer work for a charity.
11. I have helped a classmate who I did not know that well with a homework assignment when
my knowledge was greater than his or hers.
12. I have before being asked, voluntarily looked after a neighbor’s pets or children without
being paid for it.
13. I have offered to help a handicapped or elderly stranger across a street.
14. I have offered my seat on a bus or train to a stranger who was standing.
15. I have helped an acquaintance to move households.
16. I have given money to a stranger who needed it (or asked me for it).
PART 4 – Socio-Demographics
1. Risk Preferences (Dohmen et al., 2011)
How would you describe yourself? Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to
take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please tick a box on the scale, where the
value ”0” means ”not at all willing to take risks” and the value ”10” means ”very willing
to take risks”.
27Originally: “I have helped push a stranger’s car out of the snow.”
28Originally it was two different items: I have given money to charity” and “I have donated goods or
clothes to a charity”.
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2. Time Preferences (Visher et al., 2013)
How would you describe yourself? Are you generally an impatient person, or someone
who always shows great patience? Please tick a box on the scale, where the value ”0”
means ”very impatient” and the value ”10” means ”very patient”.
3. Religiosity
How would you describe yourself? How often do you pray?
• I never pray
• I seldom pray
• I pray every week
• I pray more than once a day
4. Gender
Please indicate your gender.
• Female
• Male
5. Age
Please indicate your age.
6. Status
Please indicate your status.
• Student
• Employed
• Unemployed
• Retired
(a) School - if your answer to question 6 is “Student”
Which school do you attend?
– EM Lyon
– Ecole Centrale Lyon
– ISOste´o
– Universite´ Lyon 1
– Universite´ Lyon 2
– Universite´ Lyon 3
– Universite´ Catholique de Lyon
– Other
(b) Field of Study - if your answer to question 6 is “Student”
What is your field of study?
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– Economics and Management
– Social Sciences
– Arts and Humanities
– Engineering Sciences
– Medical Studies
– Other
(c) Professional Activity - if your answer to question 6 is “Employed”
What is your current professional status?
– Farmer
– Craftsman, shopkeeper, business owner
– Executive and higher intellectual occupations
– Civil servant, administrative employee
– Employee
– Worker
7. Number of previous experiments
In how many GATE-LAB experimental sessions have you participated already?
8. Personal Login
Please choose a personal login. Choose a login that you can remember easily since you
will need this login to start the experimental session. We suggest you use ”Mother’s or
Father’s first name - her/his day of birth - her/his month of birth” without space or dash.
For example, if your mother is called Brigitte and is born a May 19th, the suggested login
is ”Brigitte1905”.
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